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# Portuguese Guinea Handbook


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## INTRODUCTION

Portuguese Guinea is the oldest and poorest of Portugal's African provinces. It has been the scene of an active and moderately successful armed insurgency since 1963. Anti-Portuguese rebels operating primarily from bases in neighboring Guinea and Senegal have tied down sizable Portuguese military forces in a guerrilla war that in 1972 seemed stalemated. Although Portuguese Guinea is of little economic value, Lisbon believes that a defeat there would encourage the active rebellions in its more valuable territories of Angola and Mozambique, and undermine the Portuguese position.

The province is among Africa's poorest and least developed countries. Deep rivers and large tracts of swamp dissect much of the interior. Both climate and topography are inhospitable. Although over 70 percent of the indigenous population engages in subsistence agriculture, the province is a net importer of food and most other vital necessities.

Portuguese Guinea is governed by Lisbon through a highly centralized administration manned largely by metropolitan Portuguese and a sizable number of Cape Verdean mulattoes, whose educational level is much higher than that of local Africans. This structure employs broad police powers, strict press censorship, and tight curbs on most political activity. The present governor, who assumed his post in 1968, has tried to give the black African majority a greater voice in running their own affairs and has shown greater interest in developing the province's weak economic base.

The durable insurgency has spurred the Portuguese to greater efforts to woo the province's 17 tribal groups through economic and social action projects. Some progress has been made among the province's Muslim tribes, notably the large Fulani group, although these groups traditionally have cooperated with the government. The rebels' recruiting efforts have been most successful among the animist tribes, particularly the Balantas, the province's largest and most backward tribe. The pagan Balantas have long resented the favoritism shown by Portugal toward the Muslim tribes. The rebels and Portuguese, who are increasingly aware of the necessity of winning the allegiance of the indigenous people, are stressing their respective abilities to provide health services, schools, and security to the population. The government has embarked on a strategic hamlet strategy, which occasions the resettlement of large groups of people. At present, the military situation is stalemated, with the Portuguese in control of key towns and most of the population, while the rebels, ensconced in tracts along the southern border and operating from sanctuaries in Senegal and Guinea, appear capable of attacking practically anywhere in the province.

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GEOGRAPHY

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## I. GEOGRAPHY

### Location and area

Portuguese Guinea, an overseas province of Portugal (sometimes known as Guinea-Bissau), is wedged between Senegal to the north and the Republic of Guinea to the east and south. Its territory includes various coastal islands and an offshore archipelago, the Bijagos Islands. Portuguese Guinea's perimeter is 605 miles, of which about 435 are land boundaries and 170 miles are coastline. With an area of about 14,000 square miles, Portuguese Guinea is almost twice the size of New Jersey.

### Topography

Much of the province is comprised of low coastal plain with numerous swamps, especially in the southwest. The coastline is deeply indented by several rivers. The country can be divided into four main regions. The Boe hills, in the east, are flat-topped, grass-covered areas with a maximum elevation of 990 feet above sea level, the highest part of the province. These hills give way to a plateau of grassy savanna where the climate is drier, and elevations are chiefly between 115 and 415 feet. Between the savanna and the coastal region lies a hot and humid forest area. The long coastal strip consists of a maze of mangrove swamps and areas of coconut palms and other tropical vegetation.

### Climate

The climate is tropical—hot and wet with two seasons. The mean average temperature is 77 degrees F. April and May are the hottest months (about 84 degrees F), and December and January the coldest (about 73 degrees F). Rainfall is abundant. The wet season lasts from June to November; during the dry season from December to May the northerly harmattan (a dust-laden wind) blows from the Sahara Desert.

### Natural resources

Agricultural—Agriculture is the principal economic activity. It is entirely an African activity; there are no European settlers. Rice is the staple food of the population. Swamp rice and upland rice amount to about 85,000 metric tons annually. An additional 15,000 tons must be imported each year. Maize, beans, cassava, and sweet potatoes also are raised by villagers to

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supplement their meager diets. Traditional exports are peanuts—approximately 50,000 tons annually in good years—grown in the interior and palm oil products. In 1969, peanuts and coconuts accounted for 60 percent and 30 percent respectively of the value of exports. Other export items include palm kernels, timber, hides, and skins. Cattle-breeding is an important activity among the Muslim tribes.

### **Minerals**

No minerals have been discovered in quantities warranting commercial exploitation.

### **Human resources**

Population composition—According to official US estimates, Portuguese Guinea had an estimated population of 489,000 in July 1972. The rate of growth was an unusually low 0.2 percent annually. The vast majority of the people are Africans, with the principal tribal groups—at least 17 have been identified—being the Balanta (30 percent), Fulani (20 percent), Mandiako (14 percent), Malinke (13 percent), and Papel (7 percent). Smaller groups include the Brame, Biafada, Felup, Bayote, Nalu, and Bissago. Wide differences prevail in language, customs, and social organization. Tribes in the coastal region, such as the Balanta, have retained their traditional religious beliefs (animism), although some have converted to Christianity. The Fulani and Malinke, located in the northeast, have been most closely associated with the Europeans. Most Fulani and Malinke are Muslim, as are the Biafada. All these tribal groups are agriculturalists. The Fulani also breed cattle. Of the nonindigenous people, mulattoes from the Portuguese Cape Verde Islands are the most numerous (about 10,000). The mulatto community is important in the middle and lower ranks of government and commerce. Most of the 2,000 resident Europeans are Portuguese; there are a number of Lebanese traders as well. Guinea has never attracted settlers because of its forbidding landscape and generally unpleasant climate. The bulk of the labor force is engaged in subsistence agriculture.

According to government figures, average population density for the province is 20 per square kilometer. The insurgency has added to normal disparities in population density. Currently, government-held areas reportedly have a population density of 40-50 per square kilometer. About 60,000 people reside at Bissau, the provincial capital and largest town. Government resettlement measures have also increased the population around the province's eight other towns, but no more than 20 percent of the province's 489,000 inhabitants live in the resettled areas or fortified hamlets. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Portuguese Guineans have taken up permanent residence in neighboring Senegal since the insurgency began.

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ECONOMIC  
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## **II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND**

### **Government policy and development**

The economy is completely dominated by metropolitan Portugal. Economic policies are formulated almost exclusively by Lisbon, although the current governor-general, Antonio de Spínola, actively pushes for development funds. Most inhabitants derive their livelihood from subsistence agriculture. The limited commercial activity that exists is dominated by Portuguese, Lebanese, and Cape Verdian tradesmen. General Spínola has had some success convincing African producers to sell their peanuts and palm oil to commercial firms and thus enter the cash economy.

Portugal and its overseas provinces have a centralized development plan, a common monetary and payments system, and a well-integrated credit system. Lisbon treats Portuguese Guinea as a captive market for Portuguese goods and by means of quotas assures that its own needs will be met by Portuguese Guinea's exports of agricultural products.

The guerrilla war in the province has prompted the government to give greater impetus to development as a means of winning over the population. In 1968, the newly appointed Governor Spínola launched a six-year Development Plan (1968-73), which aims at an annual growth rate of 7 percent. Agriculture receives first priority. Since 1968 almost \$4 million has been invested in building a modern fish processing plant at Bolama. Small shipyards at Bissau and Puana are also being expanded. In the agricultural sector, the Spínola program has placed greatest stress on convincing African farmers to enter the cash economy through the development of production and marketing cooperatives. The 1969 gross domestic product (GDP) in 1963 constant prices was \$106.5 million.

### **Labor and income**

Over 70 percent of the province's population was engaged in subsistence agriculture as of 1970. Economic development is made particularly difficult because of the lack of capital, skilled labor, technicians, and administrators, and the failure to find commercially exploitable natural resources. Wage earners are limited to a few thousand Portuguese, Cape Verdian, and Lebanese merchants, and civilian government employees. The more than 25,000 Portuguese troops in the province bolster the cash economy. Portuguese Guinea's 1969 gross domestic product (GDP) of about

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\$200 per capita, conceals the great disparity of wealth that exists between blacks and whites.

### **Structure of the economy**

Agriculture—Portuguese Guinea's economy is based exclusively on agriculture. Rice and millet are the main subsistence crops, and peanuts and palm kernels are exported. Forests occupy about one third of the area, but exploitation is limited. Livestock is important, and some hides are exported.

Lack of power has been a major obstacle to industrial development. Electrical power production in 1968 was 7.7 million kwh. A few small factories process agricultural products and produce soap. Oilseeds make up about 80 percent of exports. Most exports go to Portugal. Principal imports, mainly from Portugal, are textiles, foodstuffs, wines, and industrial products.

Mineral—Although no significant resources have been found, geologists believe that bauxite deposits of some importance may exist in the southeast. Oil prospecting operations are now taking place off the coast. Fishing offers some promise, but it is still in its infancy. The unsettled political and military conditions militate against the exploitation of any mineral wealth.

### **Transportation and telecommunications**

Surface routes—Rivers, lagoons, and canals provide a main means of transportation. Internal water transportation is important in the western two thirds of the country, and civil and naval shallow-draft vessels are used for a variety of transport missions. Besides Bissau, the major port, there are two minor ports. Some waterways are navigable by oceangoing ships for considerable distances upstream.

The Spinoia administration has made improvement of the province's limited road network a major objective. Using engineers from the metropole and local labor, the Portuguese have pushed ahead with roadbuilding as part of the countersubversion program. In addition, the new roads are intended to facilitate trade. By mid-1971, paved roads linked Bissau with Buruntuma on the Guinean border and with Texeira Pinto in the north. All told, 250 kilometers of road have been improved since 1968; 330 of the territory's 2,330 kilometers of road are now paved.

Civil Air—Portuguese Guinea has a total of 58 usable airfields, three of which have permanent surface runways. The province also has a seaplane station. Bissau airfield, the largest and most important, is capable of handling

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large passenger and military jet aircraft. TAP, the Portuguese National Airline, had four flights weekly between Lisbon and Bissau in 1972. Portuguese Guinea is also linked with Portugal's other two African provinces, Angola and Mozambique, by TAP flights. The province has its own domestic airline, whose service includes frequent hops to the Cape Verde Islands and the offshore Bijagos Islands.

Telecommunications—There are two radiotelegraph stations, 23 telegraph stations, and one radio station. In 1968, there were only 1,517 telephones. Government-owned Radio Bissau, the sole radio network, provides up to six hours daily of programming in Portuguese and in three African languages. Daily broadcasts in French and in African languages are beamed to Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. A new transmitting center near Bissau is being built by the military. Two new transmitters were built in 1970. The province has no TV station.

#### **Foreign aid**

Despite an over-all reduction in development aid from the metropole to Portugal's three African provinces, Portuguese Guinea, never a priority area for Portuguese economic planners, seems to have been given increased attention. Portugal is the only donor of economic assistance, having granted \$1.9 million in government loans in 1968 plus an undetermined amount in technical assistance grants. The guerrilla war and the province's lack of natural resources discourage potential foreign investors.

The majority of the funds needed to finance the conflict in the province is provided by the metropole in the form of a loan to the provincial government. The amount of the loan is not known.

#### **Foreign trade and balance of payments**

Portuguese Guinea's trade is totally oriented toward the metropole. The country's basic economy has undergone serious dislocations after nearly a decade of insurgency. In the best years before the conflict, the peanut crop—the chief export—was about 50,000 tons; in 1964 it was 46,000 tons and by early 1969 it had dropped to about 30,000 tons, one half exported and one half processed into oil locally. Rice has been imported in significant amounts since 1969 (15,000 tons per year). At one time the province exported between 10,000 and 20,000 tons annually.

Trade has been in serious imbalance since the insurgency began in the early sixties: exports of peanuts and peanut by-products in 1967 were \$3.2

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million and imports, mostly manufactured goods, fuels, transport equipment, and rice, amounted to \$16.4 million. Trade figures for 1969 showed exports continued at a low level (\$3.6 million) while imports had grown substantially (\$23.3 million). Future trade prospects look dim as the insurgency shows no sign of abating.

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POLITICAL  
SITUATION  
AND TRENDS

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### **III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS**

#### **Historical background**

Portugal's oldest possession on the African mainland, Portuguese Guinea, was discovered in 1446 by the Portuguese mariner Nuno Tristao. Although Cape Verde islanders were granted trading rights in the territory in 1462, few prominent trading posts appear to have been in existence before 1581. During the 17th and 18th centuries Cacheu, probably established in 1470, was the chief slave trading center of the region. After the slave trade declined in the early 19th century, Bissau, which had been founded as a fort in 1765, became the chief commercial center.

In the 19th century the Portuguese, who had held only a few coastal trading posts and did not explore the interior, found themselves contesting territorial claims by France and the United Kingdom. The island of Bolama, which had been in dispute between the United Kingdom and Portugal for more than a century, was awarded to Portugal in 1870 by US President Ulysses S. Grant, who acted as arbitrator. France and Portugal settled their problems in 1886, and final demarcation of the territory's frontiers was achieved in 1905.

In the early days of Portuguese rule, relations between the settlers and the indigenous people revolved around the slave trade. Between 1890 and 1910, when Portugal attempted to expand inland, there was a series of uprisings by the indigenous people. The country was finally pacified in 1912-15, following a series of campaigns led by Captain Teixeira Pinto. In 1941 the capital of the territory was moved from Bolama to Bissau. By constitutional amendment in 1951 the colony of Portuguese Guinea became an overseas province of Portugal. Portugal officially regards the overseas provinces as integral parts of the Portuguese nation and stresses the aim of creating a multiracial, "pluricontinental" society.

Isolated terrorism and sabotage erupted in the province in 1961, instigated largely by a group of rebels calling themselves the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). Founded in 1956 by a group of disenchanted Cape Verdeans, the PAIGC sought independence from Portuguese rule. Guerrilla warfare broke out in 1963 and has continued ever since.

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### **Government structure and functioning**

Portuguese Guinea is considered by Lisbon to be an integral part of Portugal, and it is represented currently by one seat in the 130-seat National Assembly in Lisbon. The governmental system, like that in the metropole, is based on the corporate state. Control over Portuguese Guinean affairs continues to be exercised by the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon, despite constitutional changes in August 1971 which provided for more local autonomy in the overseas provinces.

**Executive**—Executive power is vested in the Office of the Governor, who is appointed by the Council of Ministers and exercises executive and legislative authority under the guidance of the overseas minister. In recent years, largely due to the poor security situation in the province, the governorship has been filled by a general grade military officer who also functions as the commander in chief of Portuguese forces in the territory. The governor serves a four-year term and exerts a great deal of authority over all aspects of provincial affairs.

The governor is assisted in his executive duties by an advisory commission (*junta consultiva*). It consists of the governor, its presiding officer, the provincial secretary-general, the attorney general, the treasurer, and three members chosen by the provincial legislature, one of whom must represent the parishes (rural administrative units). In his legislative capacity the governor is advised by a 14-member Legislative Assembly made up of 11 elected members and three government officers serving *ex officio*. Three of the elected members are determined by direct popular vote, and eight are chosen by various interest groups (e.g., labor, employers, large taxpayers). The three *ex officio* members are the provincial secretary-general, the attorney general, and the treasurer.

Governor Spínola has run the province in his own fashion, with considerable support, but apparently without too much interference, from Lisbon. He has been allowed to develop in Portuguese Guinea counterinsurgency policies different from those pursued in the other African provinces. These include strengthening traditional institutions, maintaining close coordination between the administration and the local people, and developing cooperative efforts in various fields. Governor Spínola has also been a staunch proponent of social and economic development. Under his aegis roads, dispensaries, and schools have been built and more social services made available.

**Legislative**—The provincial 14-member Legislative Assembly exerts limited influence on the governor's decisions. The Assembly reviews the provincial budget and makes recommendations, but final authority rests with

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the governor, who in turn must answer to Lisbon. General Spínola has permitted the establishment of annual peoples' congresses—an expanded version of the traditional African village council—to sound out the Africans' views. The congresses are long (about six weeks) and unstructured and the format is largely left to the Africans. All tribal groups are represented as well as all levels of authority.

**Judicial**—The judiciary is directly responsible to Lisbon and operates under the Portuguese civil code, which is based on Roman law. African customary law also applies among the African population. Lisbon makes all judicial appointments and can remove judges at will. The province of Guinea forms one circuit within Lisbon's legal system. Trials are usually public except for political crimes, which are tried in camera. The defendant usually has no recourse to higher judicial authority.

**Civil Service**—Most members of the provincial administration are appointed by the minister for overseas or by the governor acting in his place. One major administrative shortcoming is the lack of trained black Africans to staff the provincial administration, a problem which has been particularly noticeable since the 1964 decision to Africanize many local administrative positions. So far the Portuguese have been able to place only a few Africans in these posts because of the paucity of qualified applicants. The qualifications generally require literacy in the Portuguese language and a certain amount of education beyond the primary grades. In lieu of qualified Africans the Portuguese frequently employ Cape Verdeans as well as metropolitan Portuguese.

**District and local government**—The province is divided into nine districts and three townships, each governed by prefects appointed by the governor. Rural government is based on subdivisions called administrative posts or parishes (currently numbering 51), determined largely by the economic and social development of their inhabitants. The organization of the individual tribes, which generally corresponds to traditional arrangements, has no formal relationship to the modern system of government. Traditional chiefs are considered to be representatives of the government in areas under their jurisdiction.

**Political dynamics**—Political activity is rigidly controlled according to strict guidelines issued from the metropole, where political activity other than that by officially authorized organizations is banned. General Spínola has permitted limited political activity among the indigenous population, but the activity is closely scrutinized.

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The governor has developed a Guinean branch of Portugal's political organization, National Popular Action (ANP), which unlike its counterparts elsewhere in Portuguese territory, brings together political activists of virtually all persuasions. Another striking feature of the Guinean branch of ANP is that it is virtually all black. Although some Cape Verdeans are involved, black formerly unaffiliated political activists dominate its leadership. Governor Spínola seems committed to preparing more Guineans for an increased role in running their own affairs, a novel concept among Portuguese authorities in Africa.

The constitutional revisions of August 1971, ostensibly designed to grant greater "autonomy" to the overseas provinces, do not appear to involve substantive changes. Despite name changes of provincial organs and the upgrading of provincial governors to ministerial rank, final authority over the provinces remains with Lisbon. The Portuguese Prime Minister and the overseas minister are still the key decision-makers.

Portuguese Guinea's minimal representation in the National Assembly is unlikely to change much. Voting restrictions exclude most Africans. The only legitimate channel for the expression of popular sentiment is Governor Spínola's annual People's Congresses, an ad hoc arrangement that brings together African tribal elements and provincial civil servants to exchange ideas. A limited number of Africans who have the franchise—mostly Cape Verdeans—can vote for 11 of the 14 members of the Legislative Assembly, the province's sole legislative body, which functions mainly as an advisory body to the governor.

### **Security system**

Police—Police strength in the province totals about 1,000 men, of which 600 (organized into four companies) are African administrative police. The remaining 424 are Portuguese members of the Public Security Police (PSP). In Portuguese Guinea the PSP does not have control over other paramilitary units as it does elsewhere in Portuguese Africa. The PSP is responsible for normal police functions such as deterring crime, maintaining order, and protecting lives and property. It is answerable to the minister of the interior in Lisbon who coordinates with the minister of overseas. Although the Portuguese do not maintain police forces in the villages, they do provide training and arms, upon request, to local village self-defense units. More than 100 of these units are now operational.

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#### **IV. SUBVERSION**

Portuguese forces have been hard pressed to contain the full-scale guerrilla warfare that began in Portuguese Guinea in 1963. As of early 1972, nearly 30,000 Portuguese military personnel were being used against the guerrillas, partly because of Lisbon's belief that any setback in Bissau would have a domino effect on its African empire.

Headquarters of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) are in Conakry, Guinea, which is one of the party's staunchest backers. The PAIGC has proved itself to be a serious, well-organized political and military movement. Aided by a steady stream of armaments, mainly from the Soviet Union, and financial as well as moral support from most African countries through the Organization of African Unity, the PAIGC has forced the Portuguese to concede much of the countryside and withdraw to the more easily defended urban centers. Even these do not remain immune from attack, however. Twice during 1971 the island capital of Bissau and another of the province's larger towns were subjected to rocket attacks.

PAIGC—The PAIGC was founded in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, a Lisbon-trained Cape Verdean economist. Its leadership is made up primarily of Cape Verdean mulattoes and its fighting ranks are filled largely by black Africans—mostly of the large Balanta tribe. Occasionally the blacks have expressed resentment over their having to bear a greater share of the fighting, but so far this does not seem to have adversely affected their overall combat capability.

Portugal estimates that the PAIGC has between 5,000 and 6,000 effectives and another 5,000 in a reserve or militia role. The USSR provides sufficient weapons and ammunition to permit the PAIGC to sustain its protracted campaign. In the past the PAIGC has hesitated to attack the larger towns for a variety of reasons, but in mid-1971 it did attack urban centers and, in general, exhibited greater audacity and confidence in its overall combat ability.

Guinea and Senegal provide PAIGC forces with sanctuaries, with Guinea being the much more militant supporter. Guinea serves as the major conduit for Soviet arms and other material assistance from elsewhere. Cuba provides significant help, largely in the form of instructors and training. The OAU's African Liberation Committee has given financial as well as moral support to what it considers Africa's most successful liberation movement.

Communist Subversion—Portuguese Guinea has never had a Communist party. The Portuguese assert, however, that the PAIGC is actually an extension of world communism and that it has made a deal with the Soviets to

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provide them with bases once Portugal is ousted. PAIGC leader Cabral vigorously denies being a Communist and asserts his ideological independence, claiming to be an African nationalist who seeks only independence for his people. Cabral denounces NATO and says that the US, France, and West Germany especially continue to give financial and military support to Portugal through their NATO affiliation. He considers the continuation of such aid indispensable to Portugal's sustaining its African operations.

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ARMED FORCES

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## VI. ARMED FORCES

### Organization and manpower

Portuguese Guinea's armed forces are an integral part of the armed forces of Portugal. All military units in the territory are commanded by the commander in chief of the armed forces (CINC) Portuguese Guinea, who also doubles as the provincial governor. The CINC is directly subordinate to the minister of national defense in Lisbon.

The Portuguese Army—the predominant service in the province—falls under the Independent Territorial Command of Guinea based in Bissau. Subordinate to army headquarters are four sectors (west, east, south, and Bissau), one operational group command, (CAOP) and one operational command (COP). The CAOP is a brigade-level force created to suppress insurgent activities in the west sector. Its operational area is flexible and varies to meet the insurgent threat wherever it seems greatest. The COP is a temporary battalion-sized task force, formed specifically to counter the insurgents along the Senegalese border. There is no fixed number of units assigned to the sectors or operational commands.

The Portuguese armed forces in the province were estimated at 28,000 men as of early 1972, (army: 25,500 organized mainly in battalion-sized units; air force: 1,400; navy: 1,100). In addition, the Portuguese have been training indigenous forces to carry a greater share of the struggle and have integrated some of them into the armed forces. These forces were estimated to number some 15,000: 5,000 militia, 5,000 village self-defense, and 5,000 regular army.

The armed forces have been steadily increased since 1961 to counter the spreading insurgency. General Spínola has used his military forces effectively, relying heavily on helicopters for increased mobility. The army also engages in a major civic action and pacification program, providing food, medication, education, and other assistance to the indigenous population to woo them away from the rebels. The army is also heavily involved in a population resettlement program.

Portuguese Air Force strength in Portuguese Guinea includes 450 paratroopers and 150 personnel stationed at the Portuguese air base on Sal Island in the Cape Verde Islands, which forms part of the Cape Verde - Guinea Air Zone headquartered at Bissau. The exact number of indigenous personnel in the air force in Guinea is unknown, but probably is low. There are a small number of African paratroopers. The total aircraft inventory in Guinea is 70, including 12 jet fighter-bombers (G-91). The majority of the aircraft as well as the paratroop unit are based in Bissau, although several airfields in the east and northwest sectors can handle jets.

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The principal mission of the air force is to provide close air support, trooplift, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. Although handicapped by obsolete fixed-wing aircraft, insufficient numbers of helicopters, and shortages of pilots and technicians, the air force is effective in the performance of its mission.

Portuguese naval strength in Guinea includes four special marine detachments—one of which is locally recruited—two marine companies, and an underwater demolition team. Another African marine detachment is being formed. All naval forces in Portuguese Guinea come under the Maritime Defense Command based at Bissau. Ship strength consists mainly of small patrol craft and a few larger supply vessels. The general mission of the navy (excluding the marines) is two-fold; resupply by river of land forces in the interior and river patrol. The navy's mission is crucial because 90 percent of the total resupply operations are waterborne.

#### **Military budget**

The Portuguese armed forces in Guinea receive all their military equipment and considerably more than half their financial support from Lisbon. Most of the food used by the military forces has to be imported from the metropole.

The military budget for the province is prepared by the governor in conformity with Lisbon's guidelines. The budget is then submitted to the minister of overseas for approval. Lisbon's actual contribution to finance the conflict in Guinea—in the form of a loan—is not known but the provincial share in 1969 was just over \$1 million out of a total provincial budget of about \$7 million; the lion's share of the budget went for development projects.

#### **Training and logistics**

Portugal depends almost entirely on conscription to maintain its army in both Portugal and its African provinces. Army units arriving from the metropole process through the army replacement center in Bissau, where they receive weapons and equipment. After a short orientation, units are assigned to the field, where they serve 12 to 22 month tours. Portuguese conscripts receive only four to seven weeks of basic training after which they are formed into units. These new units are then rotated with ones returning from Guinea. Any advanced or further training is conducted in combat areas under actual insurgency conditions. Indigenous personnel are recruited for military service after a careful screening. Black units are being formed and many have already been integrated into the armed services.

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The logistical system for Portuguese Guinea—unique because most of the province's supplies must be moved by water—provides adequate support for the current level of counterinsurgency. Airfield and helipad construction has brought most military units and probably 95 percent of the population within an hour of Bissau. Military units are considered well-equipped but lack sophisticated electronic and communications equipment.

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FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

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## VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS

As an integral part of Portugal, the African province of Guinea has no independent foreign policy. Portugal's major foreign policy objective—as it applies to Africa—is to defend its sovereignty over the African provinces in the face of increasingly hostile international public opinion. While showing no less a commitment than the Salazar regime to retain its African provinces, the current government of Prime Minister Caetano has promised to make long overdue reforms in the status of the overseas territories. These reforms aim at giving the two more advanced African provinces of Mozambique and Angola greater local autonomy. As for Guinea, the most economically and politically depressed of the three African territories, the protracted conflict there seems to militate against any sweeping change that might dilute Portuguese control.

Portuguese ground and air forces in Portuguese Guinea have been accused by Senegal and Guinea of territorial violations. The seriousness of these apparent border violations has increased in recent years, culminating in a Portuguese-led attack on Conakry in November 1970, which had among its objectives the toppling of the Toure regime and the destruction of anti-Portuguese rebel headquarters there. The Senegalese, who have shown some restraint in denouncing the Portuguese, became more vocal in 1971 after a series of mining incidents and shellings along their border. Senegal demanded and received UN Security Council condemnation of Portuguese activities. Dakar also showed a greater willingness to support the anti-Portuguese rebels whose movements on its territory have occasionally been subjected to tight curbs. Guinea, perhaps the shrillest of Portugal's detractors, has continued to provide the Conakry-based rebels carte blanche. Military supplies and other aid flow through Conakry en route to rebel units inside Portuguese Guinea.

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
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### VIII. US INTERESTS

The US provides no direct economic or military assistance to Portuguese Guinea and since 1961 has prohibited the direct export to Portuguese African territories of US arms or military equipment supplied to Lisbon. Exxon Oil Company (Esso) is the only US business with a significant interest in the territory. Under a 25-year concession the firm has invested over \$16 million on offshore oil exploration, so far with negative results. Exxon has leased some of its exploration rights to Texas Gulf Sulphur. US trade with Portuguese Guinea is negligible. There are very few US citizens resident in the province.

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